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This thesis examines securitization and fair value reporting practices during the global 
financial crisis. Specifically, Chapter 2 evaluates the circumstances surrounding the financial 
distress experienced by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Countrywide). Chapter 3 evaluates 
whether the information disclosures released by Countrywide in the lead up to its near­
bankruptcy provided information about the risks that other firms were exposed to more 
generally, and whether this information was reflected in the stock prices of the other firms. 
Finally, Chapter 4 examines whether the concerns relating to the relevance of Level 3 financial 
assets measured under Statement of Financial Accounting No. 157 are primarily attributable to 
those assets arising as a consequence of securitization transactions (i.e., retained interests and 
mortgage service rights) rather than Level 3 assets generally. The primary motivation for this 
thesis is to contribute to the regulatory debate that is occurring in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis (GFC). Of particular concern is whether this debate is correctly identifying the 
causes of the GFC and to provide evidence relating to: claims of the lack of transparency 
associated with securitization transactions, and whether the criticism directed at financial 
reporting is correctly focused.
The key findings of this thesis suggest that while Countrywide perhaps is an extreme 
example, its mortgage banking activities and the sudden financial distress it experienced as a 
consequence of these activities, typified the problems that beset firms in the financial services 
sector during the GFC. The risks associated with Countrywide’s securitization activities were not 
well reflected in the financial statements, and the disclosures of these transactions and their 
cumulative impacts are not clearly disclosed which likely impeded investors’ pricing decisions. 
The results of Chapter 3 provide evidence consistent with the concern that the opacity and 
complexity of securitization activities reduced the capacity of investors to value the firms’ 
equity. During the six months preceding Countrywide’s acceptance of the Bank of America’s 
offer of a $4.1 billion merger deal (January 11, 2008), Countrywide released material disclosures 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (on Form 8-K). These disclosures generated 
significant abnormal returns to the common stock of the (non-) regulated and non-financial 
firms’ common stock which is consistent with the disclosures releasing information that alerted 
investors to the true risk levels common to other firms. The magnitude of the returns realized can 
partially be explained by the firms’ securitization activities, leverage, liquidity and profitability.
Chapter 4 provides evidence that concerns relating to the reduced relevance of Level 3 
fair value assets are primarily attributable to those assets arising as a consequence of 
securitization transactions (i.e., retained interests and mortgage service rights) rather than Level 3 
assets generally. Furthermore there is evidence that the disclosures relating to securitization 
transactions are likely insufficient and potentially relevant information is being omitted from the 
financial reports. Accordingly, the criticism being leveled against Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 157 might more correctly be directed towards Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 140 (FASB 2000).
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